Towards enhancing humanitarian action for the Sudanese people (March 2025)

22 Apr

By Professor Mekki El Shibly

I. The Status Quo

The raging war in Sudan between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is witnessing a long-standing impasse inflamed by the limitation of discretional solutions of bilateral initiatives represented by the Jeddah Platform sponsored by the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Geneva; and multilateral initiatives sponsored by the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and neighbouring countries. Several factors have contributed to the continuation of the calamitous war, including the power struggle, the fear of accountability for crimes against humanity committed by both sides, the determination of Islamic groups to regain the power that the people wrested from them by the December Revolution, external influences fueling the conflict and the military dynamics resulting from the rapid territorial gains made by the (RSF), despite the gains initially claimed by (SAF) and the recent reversal of the gains in favour of the (SAF). The escalation of the war confirms that the grave security and humanitarian impasse in Sudan, which was triggered by the October 2021 inauspicious coup, and aggravated the devastating April 2023 war, has substantiated the failure of military solutions to address the tenacious humanitarian crises in Sudan.

This situation, targeted attacks on ethnic groups and individuals, the looting of property, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law have resulted in the biggest forced displacement crisis in the world. A total of 12,510, 544 million persons, 8,856,313 of whom have been forcibly displaced within Sudan and 3,388,082 outside, primarily in neighbouring countries, as of 10 February 2025 according to UNHCR. The figures setting out the level of humanitarian needs are stark: 30.4 million persons out of a total population of 47.5 million require multiple forms of assistance for a total of $4.2 billion, with 26 million persons living in food insecurity, and famine conditions in several locations, as set out in the OCHA Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

Tragically, the resulting humanitarian crisis in Sudan has reached catastrophic levels, with multiple dimensions affecting millions as thousands of Sudanese lost their lives. Nearly 9 million people have been displaced within Sudan, and over 3 million have been displaced in neighbouring countries as refugees. 25.6 million people (over half the population) are facing acute hunger. 18 million people are experiencing severe levels of acute food insecurity. The war has also severely impacted healthcare and essential services. 80% of health facilities in conflict-affected areas are barely operational or destroyed. Fatal diseases including cholera, dengue fever, and malaria are commonplace, as millions lack access to safe drinking water. There are reports of widespread human rights violations, including gender-based violence and killings. Accusations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing have been made against both warring parties. All this is further complicated by the mounting difficulty facing humanitarian action for Sudan as the country is rated as having extreme constraints (5 out of 5) on humanitarian access. This scale and complexity of Sudan's humanitarian crisis require urgent multifaceted international engagement and a coordinated response to prevent further deterioration and loss of life.

II. The Dire Consequences to the International Community of Sudan War Escalation

1. The Regional Humanitarian Crisis

As for neighbouring countries' humanitarian anguish resulting from the Sudan war, over 2.1 million people have crossed into neighboring countries seeking safety and refuge. Chad has received the largest number of refugees (571,815), followed by Egypt (500,000), South Sudan (135,085), Ethiopia (33,389), and the Central African Republic (23,286). It is estimated that all refugees and migrants affected by the Sudan crisis may require life-saving assistance in these countries throughout 2024. All these 5 countries have recently suffered internal conflicts or severe economic difficulties, making it hard for them to accommodate additional Sudanese refugees. As a result, Sudanese refugees in these countries often face immense challenges, including reported threats of deportation and mass arbitrary detentions. Hence, the humanitarian consequences of the war in Sudan are not confined to its borders but have a significant impact in destabilising the whole of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel regions.

2. Impact of Enhanced War-driven Migration and Refugees on Europe

The war in Sudan also threatens much worse scenarios, including the increased illegal flow of refugees to Europe. Historically, the EU launched the “Khartoum Process” in 2014 aiming to combat human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe. Out of a €2 billion Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in 2015, €160 million were allocated specifically to Sudan for migration-related programmes.

As a result of the war, the number of UNHCR-registered Sudanese in Tunisia increased by 11-fold from 513 to 5,866 in 2023. The continuation of this alarming trend due to the war creates pressure for onward movement towards Europe if it continues to be more concerned with containing migration flows than addressing root causes. Hence, the continuance of Europe’s inadequate response to the serious consequences of Sudan war will trigger increased migration flows towards Europe, especially via the Central Mediterranean route. As such, Europe does not have more time to watch the belligerents’ shopping for further bilateral and multilateral initiatives to pursue their regurgitation of mutual futile accusations.

3. Impact on U.S. Security and Economy Under the Trump Administration

While Trump's "America First" policy suggests he may have limited interest in directly intervening in Sudan's internal conflicts, several concerns could persuade him to act positively toward stopping the conflict. The massive humanitarian crisis resulting from the war is increasing the pressure on the U.S. to enhance its humanitarian aid and support for the whole affected region. The U.S. has already provided substantial aid to Sudan, and the worsening situation may require even more financial and logistical assistance. The ongoing conflict raises several security concerns for the U.S. new administration, including transferring Sudan as a potential breeding ground for extremist groups. Trump's policy might include measures to prevent Sudan from becoming a link for violent extremists between the Sahel region and terrorist groups in Somalia and Yemen. The focus of Trump on encouraging Sudan's participation in the Abraham Accords might persuade him to offer further economic and diplomatic incentives. It is to be recalled that During his previous term, Trump removed Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which unblocked economic aid and investment.

Although Sudan is not a major U.S. trading partner, the war could affect U.S. companies with investments or operations in Sudan. As the conflict affects global commodity markets, the U.S. could also be affected by the impact of the war on the significant Sudan natural resources, including Gum Arabic, oil, and gold. During his previous term, Trump's administration was criticised for engaging too closely with Sudanese military leaders, including Burhan and Hemedti, at the expense of civil society. This policy could continue as he might focus on working with whoever holds power to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in the region, As for Trump’s attitude toward civil democratic transformation in Sudan, the president-elect is known for his approach involving pragmatic engagement with Sudan's military leaders. In general, the Trump administration is likely to focus more on U.S. strategic interests in the region than on specific internal Sudanese politics or humanitarian concerns.

4. War Escalation Transforms Sudan to a Hub for International Terrorism

During 1991-1996, al-Qaeda was headquartered in Sudan under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Supported by the Islamist regime, al-Qaeda established training camps and expanded its financial network in Sudan, laying the groundwork for future global operations. Al-Qaeda also provided military and intelligence training in Sudan for its own members and affiliated groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2017, the terrorist groups now regard Sudan as a strategic location to expand their operations across North and sub-Saharan Africa following the vacuum resulting from the war. Furthermore, recent al-Qaeda publications and statements by leaders like Abu Hudhaifa al-Sudani indicate a renewed focus on Sudan as a potential area for operations. It is concerning that some Sudanese militant groups heavily armed by the de facto Islamist Sudanese government share ideological similarities with al-Qaeda in terms of pursuing an Islamist agenda and opposing the West. These historical and current ties between al-Qaeda and Sudanese Islamists demonstrate that war-torn Sudan provides an important strategic location for Islamist terrorism to re-establish its presence.

However, despite the serious implications to the West of migration and terrorism resulting from the Sudan war, the United States and Europe appear to have different approaches to these imminent threats. While Europe seems to focus on Sudan's role in regional stability and migration issues, the United States approach focuses more on counter-terrorism concerns.

5. Consequences on International Trade

The conflict in Sudan could spill over into neighboring countries, potentially destabilising the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, as it shares borders with seven countries in an already unstable region. Sudan is also located on the Red Sea and near the Suez Canal. The recent Hothi serious threat to international trade through the Red Sea could be maximized if Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Sudan capitalise on the war to boost their maritime capabilities, to further threaten the crucial Suez Canal trade routes. Hence, Sudan's instability could interfere with trade flows through these vital waterways. This could negatively impact European efforts to expand trade with countries in these regions. Moreover, it could restrain the ability of European and other African nations to trade efficiently with each other and the rest of the world. Significantly, Sudan is a major producer and exporter of key commodities like gum Arabic, which is used widely in the food, beverage, cosmetics, and printing industries. War-driven disruptions to Sudan's exports could impact global consumer goods sectors and businesses in Europe reliant on these vital supplies. On the other hand, the war’s disruption to agricultural production in Sudan poses risks to global food security and inflation rates as the reduced supply of these products from Sudan could lead to higher food prices, potentially affecting inflation in European countries. The war is also likely to deter foreign investment in Sudan and potentially neighbouring countries, which could slow economic growth in the region. This could reduce the purchasing power and trade capacity of African countries in their relations with Europe.

III. International Community’s Response to the Dreadful Humanitarian Consequences of the Sudan War

There is a dire need for the international community to revise the ineffective measures of timid economic sanctions and the token arms embargo imposed on both parties. The avoidance of Sudan falling into a more destructive and horrific civil war requires the replacement of current discretional initiatives with more de rigueur dynamism. It is necessary to compel the belligerents to accept direct bilateral dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).

Given the extent of the crimes against humanity committed by SAF and RSF, coordination between the United Nations and the African Union has become imperative to devise a robust mechanism capable of halting the war without the apprehension of confrontation between the five veto-wielding powers that dominate global geopolitics. Any Security Council resolution invoking Clause No. (7) in Sudan remains subject to a potential Russian or Chinese veto. The recent Russian veto of a UNSC resolution, authored by the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone, calling for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan, diminishes any hope of any UNSC role in stopping the war.

Although the United Nations General Assembly "Uniting for Peace" resolution (No. 377A(V)), issued in 1950, allows the General Assembly to intervene in cases of threats to international peace and security when the Security Council is unable to act due to a veto, the implementation of this outdated resolution faces challenges. These challenges include the availability of political will among member states and their capacity to cooperate in enforcing General Assembly decisions related to peace and security. Additionally, the General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, unlike the Security Council resolutions under Clause No. (7). Furthermore, the General Assembly cannot mandate forcible military intervention, which remains the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. Therefore, the effectiveness of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution in imposing a ceasefire in Sudan has diminished, as the five permanent members of the Security Council have realised that this resolution could harm their interests.

In view of these challenges, the international community’s effort to stop the Sudan war has so far been confined to diplomatic, economic, and political pressure, accountability mechanisms through envoys, humanitarian support, and encouraging regional involvement. As these measures failed to materialise, there are calls for imposing more stringent measures including the following:

1. No-fly Zones

The recent increased use of fighter jets and drones has significantly altered the dynamics of the conflict in Sudan. SAF has enhanced the use of fighter planes and Iranian-made drones like the Mohajer-6. On the other hand, SAF has also deployed quadcopter drones capable of dropping mortar shells, allegedly supplied by the UAE. This resulted in higher civilian casualties and further destruction of infrastructure and public utilities prompting the push for the enforcement of a no-fly zone. Although no-fly zones may reduce civilian casualties, their implementation faces several challenges, including the likely breach by the belligerents due to the difficulty in passing UN Security Council authorisation, preferably under Chapter VII, and its inability to prevent land-based killing and destruction.

2. Green Zones (Safe Havens)

Green zones (Safe Havens) in Sudan have been proposed as a practical measure to protect civilians and mitigate the humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing war. The objectives of these zones include allowing civilians to maintain normal livelihoods, access essential services, and contribute to economic preservation through agricultural and economic activity. However, the establishment of the green zones requires selecting a strategic location to facilitate aid delivery, criteria set by development partners and humanitarian organisations, not SAF and RSF, due consideration of housing capacity, infrastructure for social services, and potential economic benefits, coordination involving local communities, humanitarian actors, and international partners. To ensure the safety and effectiveness of green zones (safe heavens), there is a need for a joint monitoring mechanism involving SAF and RSF and a neutral third party, satellite monitoring to provide real-time notifications of potential threats and a joint monitoring body that can convene in response to escalating threats and demand withdrawal of forces or authorise defensive actions.

Despite the call from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to protect civilians and ensure safe access to humanitarian aid, the enforcement of green zones (safe havens) in the ongoing Sudan war to stop widespread sexual violence, arbitrary arrests, torture, and ethnic targeting is no less challenging. To overcome these difficulties, enhanced international support is indispensable. This support includes planning and coordination, technical assistance, monitoring and protection, maintenance of law and order, environmental management, conflict resolution, and capacity building. Significantly, the international community’s support is particularly needed to deter SAF and the RSF from infiltrating these green zones to use its civilian occupants as human shields during their continuing fighting.

It is significant to recognise that the creation of green zones (safe havens) in Sudan is not a lasting solution to the war, but rather a proposed measure to mitigate its immediate humanitarian impacts. They do not resolve the underlying political, economic, and social issues driving the war. While green zones (safe havens) could provide much-needed immediate relief and protection for civilians, they should be viewed as part of a broader strategy rather than a standalone solution to the war. A lasting peace in Sudan will require addressing the complex interaction of political, economic, environmental, and social factors driving the conflict.

3. Arms Embargo on all of Sudan

The current limited arms embargo was initially imposed by the United Nations in July 2004 on non-governmental entities in Darfur. It was expanded in March 2005 to include all parties to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement. In March 2023, the embargo was changed from an openended measure to a time-limited one, with the current extension set to last until September 12, 2025. Despite the embargo's existence, there are significant limitations and challenges, including geographical limitations as the embargo only applies to the Darfur region, not the entire Sudan .

There are also reports of continued violations of the arms embargo, with weapons flowing into Sudan from various countries. Accordingly, there are calls for expanding the embargo to cover the entire country, given the spread of conflict beyond Darfur. Because of these challenges, the Security Council continues to monitor the situation, with ongoing debates about the effectiveness and potential expansion of the sanctions regime. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International experts are advocating for expanding the embargo to all of Sudan and strengthening its monitoring and verification mechanisms. On the other hand, experts call for the UN Security Council to sanction individuals and entities violating the embargo. Some also recommend prohibiting the transfer of firearms marketed to civilians (e.g., shotguns, hunting rifles) that have been documented in the hands of the belligerents. In view of these challenges, an expanded embargo to cover all of Sudan would need to be adequately resourced to be effective. Due consideration must be given to stronger enforcement mechanisms and broader international commitment for the arms embargo to be truly impactful.

IV. Towards a HAS Advocacy Strategy

1. The Relationship Between HAS Advocacy and Strategic Directions

The relationship between advocacy and strategy for humanitarian action in Sudan is critical, especially in the context of the ongoing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the war. Advocacy serves as a catalyst for shaping effective humanitarian a strategy that addresses the urgent needs of affected populations while promoting systemic changes necessary for long-term recovery and resilience. The advocacy strategy for HAS is the overarching plan that guides advocacy efforts towards achieving specific goals. It encompasses the overall direction and course of action for managing relationships between HAS and its humanitarian environment, a pattern of activities to be followed in pursuit of long-term humanitarian objectives, and a process of identifying, protecting, leveraging, and renewing strategic capabilities. Hence HAS advocacy strategy must include goal setting by defining clear, specific objectives to be achieved through identifying relevant decision-makers and potential partners. This requires careful resource allocation to determine how to best utilise available resources and selecting appropriate advocacy tactics to advance the strategic goals, bearing in mind establishing a timeline with important quantifiable milestones.

The interplay between advocacy and strategy in Sudan's humanitarian action is essential for HAS to address the immediate humanitarian needs while laying the groundwork for sustainable peace and development. By advocating for civilian protection, emergency humanitarian aid, democratic governance, and local engagement, HAS can help shape strategies responsive to the realities on the ground, ultimately aiming to alleviate suffering and promote resilience among affected populations.

2. HAS Strategic Framework

HAS needs to draw a multi-year humanitarian strategy to establish a framework that links immediate humanitarian responses with long-term development goals after the war. This approach emphasises the need for time-bound funding commitments from donors, which HAS works to secure through awareness campaigns and lobbying efforts. Engaging local actors is essential for an effective HAS strategy as it incorporates local knowledge and capacities into humanitarian responses. Advocacy emphasizes the importance of decentralising humanitarian efforts, empowering local NGOs, and integrating community-led initiatives into broader humanitarian plans to enhance effectiveness and relevance. The strategic framework also embodies coordination with stakeholders, including governmental bodies, international organisations, and local communities. This coordinated approach is essential for energising HAS to address the multifaceted humanitarian challenges of the war, ensuring that all parties coherently work towards common goals. HAS also needs to establish monitoring mechanisms to track progress against objectives and evaluate the impact of advocacy efforts. This includes setting Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure success and adapting strategies based on feedback.

3. How Can Strategic Thinking Enhance HAS Advocacy Strategy

Strategic thinking can significantly enhance HAS advocacy strategy in several key ways including enabling HAS to see the big picture and understand their organisation's mission and advocacy issues within the broader context of the external environment. This holistic view allows for more comprehensive and effective HAS humanitarian engagement. By employing strategic thinking, HAS can tailor its planning and resource allocation to account for changing humanitarian circumstances. This flexibility and adaptability are crucial in the dynamic landscape of advocacy, where political and social environments can shift rapidly. Strategic thinking also involves critical analysis, questioning assumptions, challenging existing practices, and critically analysing information. This approach leads to more robust HAS’s advocacy strategy that can withstand scrutiny and opposition. A further component of strategic thinking is creative problem-solving to inspire new ideas and suggestions. This can lead to innovative advocacy tactics and approaches that enhances the efficiency of HAS resource allocation. This is particularly important given HAS’s resource-constrained advocacy campaign. Strategic thinking also encourages HAS to break down broad humanitarian aims into manageable steps and develop a step-wise approach. The long-term perspective helps in leveraging resources and incrementally fulfilling the overall aim of the advocacy campaign. By incorporating these elements of strategic thinking, HAS can develop more comprehensive, adaptable, and effective advocacy strategy that is better positioned to achieve the desired outcomes.

4. Harmonising a Positive Role of the Regional Key Actors to Assist Humanitarian Action

The key regional actors represented by Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Chad, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic (CAR) play crucial roles in humanitarian assistance for Sudan. However, the harmonisation of their efforts faces daunting challenges triggered by their diverse motivations and connections with the two warring sides, SAF and RSF. While Egypt and Ethiopia are motivated by internal security concerns in their relations with SAF and RSF, KSA prioritises ideological worries. On the other hand, the UAE appears to be driven by its economic interests. On the other hand, Chad and CAR seem concerned with the socioeconomic consequences of the influx of refugees.

The international community can still encourage these regional key actors to prioritise humanitarian action in Sudan and address the urgent needs of the affected population. The international community should intensify the diplomatic channels to engage with these key regional actors focusing on emphasising the humanitarian crisis and its potential regional destabilising effects, encouraging these actors to use their leverage over the warring parties to facilitate humanitarian access and support a ceasefire and coordinating efforts to prevent conflicting agendas that may exacerbate the situation. Furthermore, there is a scope for offering economic incentives for the cooperating actors and imposing economic sanctions against countries and individuals or entities obstructing humanitarian aid or fueling the conflict. At the multilateral level, there is a need to support the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) to facilitate humanitarian access and encourage regional bodies like the African Union and IGAD to take a more visible and active role in mediating the conflict. The vital domestic role can be enhanced by providing more direct flexible funding to local Sudanese

NGOs and grassroots initiatives like Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs). Despite access and financial constraints, these groups have proven effective at delivering humanitarian assistance. Creating clear pathways for local organisations to engage with regional bodies like the African Union and IGAD is also necessary. Investing in long-term capacity building for local NGOs and community-based groups to strengthen their ability to respond effectively is vital for enhancing their operational capabilities.

5. Heightening International Media Coverage of Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis

Several approaches can be implemented to enhance international media coverage of Sudan's intensifying humanitarian crisis potentially leading to greater awareness, support, and action from the global community. First and foremost, it is important to work with SAF, RSF, and international organisations to create safe corridors for journalists to access affected areas. This would allow for more firsthand reporting and compelling stories that can capture global attention. Facilitating the cooperation between international and independent local journalists can offer unique perspectives and insights that international media might miss. Streamlining the reporting process and ensuring accurate information dissemination benefit greatly from establishing a centralised media hub that can provide verified data, updates, and contacts to international journalists. Amplifying Sudanese voices and drawing attention to the wartriggered humanitarian crisis can also be enhanced by encouraging the use of specific hashtags like #SupportSudan to create a unified social media campaign. Highlighting human interest stories focusing on personal narratives and the impact of the crisis on individuals and communities can create emotional connections with audiences worldwide.

The regular briefings by UN agencies, NGOs, and local humanitarian organisations can provide consistent updates to the international media, keeping the crisis in the news cycle. It is also helpful to collaborate and partner with influential media outlets and major international news organisations to produce in-depth reports, documentaries, or series on the Sudan humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, it is also useful to utilise alternative media platforms like engaging with podcasts, YouTube channels, and online news platforms to reach diverse audiences who may not consume traditional media. Organising international media visits and coordinated trips for international journalists to visit affected displacement areas and refugee camps in neighbouring countries, providing them with firsthand experiences to report on. The provision of multimedia resources through creating a repository of high-quality photos, videos, and infographics of the humanitarian calamity that media outlets can easily access and use in their reporting. The engagement with Sudanese diaspora groups and communities provide an important source of stories and perspectives that can be of interest to international media in their respective countries. To underscore its global significance, it is highly important to emphasise the potential impact of Sudan’s humanitarian crisis on regional stability and international security. Special attention should be given to the consequent imminent terrorist threat and migration to Western countries.

6. Addressing the Challenges of Limited Funds and Access Constraints

i. Boosting the Awareness of Resource Mobilisation and Access to the Victims

The ongoing war in Sudan has severely impacted humanitarian action due to limited funds and access constraints. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is managing a multi-donor pooled fund is receiving a scrimp response. The UN 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan is 57.3% funded, with $1,543.5 million received out of $2,695.7 million required. Despite the UK’s announcement of doubling its aid package to £113 million ($141 million) for Sudan and neighbouring countries affected by the war, the total humanitarian funding reported for Sudan in 2024 is $1.63 billion. The UN and partners have reported that their humanitarian appeal for Sudan is severely underfunded, limiting their ability to provide essential aid and services. The scale of humanitarian needs far outpaces available funding and resources. This led to critical shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and other basic supplies needed for humanitarian action. The war has disrupted supply chains and made it difficult to transport goods within Sudan.

On the other hand, the grave insecurity associated with the fighting, especially in major cities and key transport routes, has made it extremely dangerous for aid workers to access many areas. ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project) has rated the constraints on humanitarian access in Sudan as "extreme" (5 out of 5). Several humanitarian staff have been killed or injured in the violence. Accessibility is also hampered by bureaucratic obstacles as aid agencies face significant administrative hurdles in obtaining travel permits, visas for international staff, and clearances to move supplies across conflict lines. Infrastructure damage including the destruction of roads, bridges, airports, and communication networks has severely impaired the ability of humanitarian organisations to reach affected populations and coordinate their response efforts .

Due to these challenges, humanitarian action for Sudan is only reaching a fraction of the people in need. Many vulnerable populations in 14 state hotspots remain cut off from life-saving aid . This dire situation is severely aggravated by the scaling-back of the operations of several humanitarian aid agencies leaving critical gaps in healthcare, nutrition, water, and sanitation services. The competing geopolitical interests underscored by the Russian veto to the British humanitarian-driven resolution have also undermined cohesive international action.

ii. Overcoming the Limited Funds and Access Challenges

A multi-faceted strategy leading to increased international support, improved security guarantees for humanitarian aid workers, and negotiated humanitarian access agreements between the SAF and RFS is required to overcome these funding and accessibility challenges.

As for fund mobilisation, it is important to secure multi-year funding mechanisms to ensure continuity and predictability of support. Leveraging high-level events like the UN General Assembly can build global support and commitments from member states. The United Nations General Assembly "Uniting for Peace" resolution (No. 377A(V)), issued in 1950, allows the General Assembly to intervene in cases of threats to international peace and security, like the Sudan war, when the Security Council is unable to act due to a veto. Fund mobilisation also benefits from enhancing advocacy and awareness through international media coverage of Sudan's humanitarian crisis. This can be achieved through firsthand reporting and compelling stories that can capture global attention. Amplifying Sudanese voices and drawing attention to the war-triggered humanitarian crises can also be enhanced by using specific hashtags like #ActionSudan to create a unified social media campaign for raising funds. Highlighting human interest stories focusing on personal narratives and the impact of the crisis on individuals and communities can create emotional connections with audiences worldwide. Engaging Sudanese private sector partners and diaspora networks is also useful for availing additional funds. Considering the limited funds available, it is important to prioritise support for women and girls, who are bearing the brunt of violence and discrimination. Addressing both immediate needs and long-term resilience requires combining humanitarian and development funding.

On the other hand, to address the access challenges hampering humanitarian action for Sudan, a comprehensive strategy must be implemented that tackles both immediate barriers and underlying systemic issues. International donors must urge SAF and RSF to cease obstructing humanitarian access by amplifying calls for compliance with international humanitarian law. It is also helpful to persuade Sudanese authorities to simplify visa and travel permit processes for humanitarian workers. This includes advocating for expedited approvals and reducing bureaucratic red tape that delays aid delivery. Removing unnecessary restrictions at the Adre border crossing from Chad is important for ensuring continuous access and timely delivery of humanitarian supplies. Leveraging community-led initiatives like Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) can provide immediate assistance due to their agility and knowledge of domestic challenges compared to larger organisations. Furthermore, investing in training and capacity building for community-based organisations can enhance their ability to deliver services effectively. This includes financial management training and operational support . Monitoring, evaluation, and establishing mechanisms to track the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions can ensure accountability in resource allocation and responsiveness to emerging needs. This includes establishing feedback mechanisms by creating channels for affected populations to provide feedback on aid access processes, allowing adjustments based on community needs and preferences.

7. Scaling Up Cash Transfers to Address the Severe Hunger Crisis

i. Advocacy for Cash-Based Humanitarian Interventions in Sudan

Advocacy for cash-based humanitarian interventions in Sudan has gained urgency due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the war. Cash-based interventions are seen as an effective tool to address the severe hunger crisis in Sudan, as cash provides life-saving assistance compared to in-kind aid delivery constrained by access risks and high operational costs. Experience in Darfur showed that 97% of cash recipients spent the money on food, confirming its effectiveness in supporting access to food from local markets. Cash also stimulates resilience as it dynamises local markets and economies, whereas in-kind assistance depresses them. However, despite its potential, cash programming is still not prioritised for Sudan. Hence, there is urgency for an advocacy plan to call for donors to expedite disbursing pledges and increase funding for cash assistance. It is important to follow evidence-based advocacy by utilising data and case studies demonstrating the success of cash programming to build a compelling case for its implementation in Sudan. The advocacy action should also include public awareness campaigns aiming at raising awareness through media campaigns highlighting the predicament of affected populations and the potential benefits of cash assistance. Personal stories from beneficiaries can humanise the issue and create a sense of urgency among the donor community. Supporting local organisations by building their capacity is important for effective cash-based programmes. This includes training on financial management, market assessments, and beneficiary targeting to ensure that interventions are responsive to community needs. Establishing mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of cash programmes and reporting on their impacts is also crucial for obtaining the desired results. Regular updates can also help maintain momentum and accountability among stakeholders involved in humanitarian responses.

ii. Addressing the Challenges in Delivering Humanitarian Cash Assistance

Delivering cash assistance in conflict-affected areas of Sudan faces several challenges that hinder effective implementation. Financial Service Providers (FSPs) in Sudan often struggle with liquidity, making it difficult to provide cash transfers to beneficiaries when needed. This is exacerbated by the overall economic instability and inflation resulting from the war. The war severely impacted the operational capacity of banks and financial institutions, limiting their ability to facilitate cash transfers. The 14 states suffering from the war lack functioning banking services, which complicates the distribution of cash assistance. Interruptions in mobile networks also hinder the ability to conduct mobile cash transfers, which are crucial for delivering assistance in many regions. While informal money transfer agents have become vital for delivering cash in areas where formal banking systems are down, the reliance on informal money transfer agents can be risky and inconsistent, affecting the reliability of cash assistance delivery. On the other hand, the war has led to skyrocketing food prices (up by 100%) diminishing the purchasing power of cash recipients. Even when cash is distributed, beneficiaries may struggle to afford essential goods due to inflated prices.

Overcoming these challenges to humanitarian cash transfers in Sudan requires adopting key strategies including diversifying Financial Service Providers (FSPs) by working with multiple FSPs including banks, microfinance institutions, and informal money transfer agents to address liquidity and access constraints. Leveraging informal money transfer agents is crucial for delivering cash in areas where formal banking systems are down. There is also a need to adapt to telecommunication disruptions by implementing small-scale programmes where transfers are feasible, intending to scale up using alternative methods that can operate when networks are down. As for overcoming liquidity scarcity, it is useful to partner with FSPs to assess their capacity to ensure cash availability, and work with multiple providers to increase overall liquidity in the system. Cash transfers can also benefit from improved coordination among humanitarian actors to share information on challenges and solutions. Adapting to market instability can be achieved through continuous monitoring of market conditions and inflation with the assistance of the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, and adjusting transfer values as needed to preserve purchasing power in the face of inflation. Additionally, addressing the operational challenges can be enhanced by working with authorities to streamline administrative processes for humanitarian workers and cash transfers, and advocacy for removing arbitrary restrictions that hinder delivery. By implementing these strategies, humanitarian action can overcome the significant challenges facing cash transfer programmes in Sudan and improve their effectiveness in addressing urgent needs.

V. The Hybrid Techno-Human Mechanism to Safeguard the Humanitarian Action for Sudan

The failure of the Jeddah Forum and other initiatives to achieve a sustainable ceasefire and halt the crimes against humanity in Sudan has confirmed that curbing the devastating confrontations between the SAF and RSF requires a hybrid mechanism. This includes a combination of modern technologies to enhance monitoring capabilities and limited military and civilian observers who build trust and interpret data. Technology should complement, not replace, human monitoring. For this hybrid mechanism to succeed, it shall have clear mandates and detailed agreements on what needs to be monitored, as well as a combination of technologies such as drones, cameras, satellites, and acoustic sensors to detect the source of violations. Information management systems must also be provided to collect, analyse, and interpret data, with structures in place for managing violations and preventing escalation. Additionally, internal and external communication strategies should be established, along with independent elements from civilians and civil society to participate in monitoring, ensuring local ownership of the monitoring mechanism.

The human component of the hybrid mechanism includes impartial regional observers who monitor ceasefire operations and crimes against humanity, composed primarily of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). This option is necessitated by the UN Secretary-General who stated on 27 October 2024 that the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a United Nations force to protect civilians in Sudan. The implementation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union represents a preponderant option to provide the necessary robust human component for imposing a ceasefire in Sudan and enforcing the Jeddah Declaration, which has remained unimplemented due to the absence of an effective mechanism to compel the SAF and RSF to comply. It is worth noting that, according to Article No. 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Union forces have intervened militarily in Burundi, Uganda, Mozambique, and Sudan to maintain peace as part of the African Union's protection of its member states from war crimes and atrocities against humanity.

These observers work on the ground, monitoring, reporting and contributing to de-escalation efforts, while also facilitating the participation of civilians and local civil society in the ceasefire process and the tracking of atrocities against civilians. The role of these observers remains critical even with the support of modern technology in monitoring activities. Their responsibilities include proactively addressing potential triggers of violations or misunderstandings between the SAF and RSF, building trust through direct communication with both warring parties and affected civilians, and conducting patrols and investigative missions in conjunction with technological systems. It is important to note that this hybrid mechanism must precede any transitory cease-fire arrangements such as no-fly zones and safe havens.

EASF was established by the African Union as a regional mechanism to provide the capacity to rapidly deploy forces, and implement preventive stationing, rapid intervention, and peace support. In April 2005, a memorandum of understanding was signed, and amended in January 2011, to explicitly identify EASF as a subsidiary of the African Standby Force (ASF). It currently includes 10 active member states, including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

It is to be underscored that Sudan is not only an active member of EASF but also assumed its leadership, as then Brigadier General Alaa El-Din Osman Mirghani held this position during the period 2017-2020. He was later promoted to a Major General as he served as Director of the Department of International Relations in SAF in 2022. Evidence also affirms that the entry of EASF into Sudan is not new, as these forces conducted, under Sudanese leadership, the “East Peace 2” exercise, which was launched in 2017 in Jebait area in the Red Sea State. More than a thousand personnel from EASF ten member states participated in this exercise, in the presence of experts from the United Nations and the European Union.

The protocols for establishing EASF have stipulated cooperation with the United Nations and its agencies, including the Security Council, international organisations, other relevant regional organisations, national authorities, and non-governmental organisations, when necessary. When EASF is deployed in Sudan, the African Union and the United Nations shall assume operational control over it. EASF must work in coordination with various national and multilateral partners who provide it with the necessary financial, logistical, and technical support to accomplish its missions and ensure its full independence from any influence by the warring parties. The bilateral partners, who are perilously threatened by the immigration crisis resulting from the war, include France, Japan, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark,

Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. EASF is also expected to receive assistance from multilateral sources, including the United Nations, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the European Union.

The optimal use of technology in the monitoring mechanism, can limit the EASF force to a financially plausible 5,000 personnel for no more than 3 years by utilising satellites for reconnaissance, early warning, and communications. It is to be recalled that the cost UNAMID mission to Sudan comprising about 26,000 personnel at its peak was in the range of $10-15 billion over its 14-year duration. The cost of the limited EASF force, composed entirely of neighbouring African countries for a much shorter period is not expected to exceed $3 billion, compared to the diverse UNAMID multinational force drawn from countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, and South America.

VI. Ensuring Domestic Ownership of the Humanitarian Action through Engaging Sudanese Centers of Excellence and Think Tanks

The marginalisation of local expertise and context-specific actions is impairing the meagre efforts to address the devastating humanitarian consequences of the Sudan war which is approaching 23 months. Specifically, the neglect of the important role of RCs and non-partisan civil society, led by Sudanese Centres of Excellence and the national Think Tanks is downsizing the impact of bilateral and multilateral initiatives for humanitarian action to protect civilians. The independent national centres and institutions can assist in holding bilateral dialogue between SAF and RSF from a professional standpoint devoid of political and regional affiliations. This public conviction stems from the glorious December Revolution’s enhancement, strengthening the humanitarian action by homegrown trait requires the participation of these entities in all stages of the international community’s action. Good practices in developing countries have demonstrated the success of national centres of excellence and think tanks in resolving intractable disputes in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Tunisia. These entities can contribute valuable local knowledge, research, and expertise to support humanitarian action in several key ways including the following:

i. Context-Specific Action

Sudanese centres of excellence, think tanks, and RCs possess an in-depth understanding of the local context, cultural nuances, and complex dynamics of the humanitarian consequences of the war. This local expertise is invaluable for developing context-appropriate humanitarian action and policy recommendations. Their insights can help the international community tailor their action to be more effective and culturally sensitive. Involving all stakeholders from the bottom up and amplifying the voices of local responders is crucial for effective humanitarian action. This role could be enhanced by establishing formal collaboration agreements between Sudanese think tanks and international NGOs, commissioning research from Sudanese think tanks on local dynamics and needs, incorporating local knowledge and perspectives into programme design and implementation, developing mentorship programmes pairing Sudanese researchers with experienced international counterparts, and adapting global best practices to fit the Sudanese context based on local expertise.

ii. Advocacy and Policy Influence

Sudanese think tanks and centres of excellence engage in advocacy efforts to raise awareness about the humanitarian situation in Sudan and influence policy decisions at national and international levels. Their research and recommendations can inform diplomatic efforts, donor strategies, and humanitarian response plans .

iii. Facilitating Coordination and Dialogue

Think tanks and centres of excellence can serve as neutral conveners to harmonise the humanitarian actions of diverse stakeholders, including SAF, RSF, the de facto government, civil society, and international actors, and foster dialogue between local mutual aid groups, diaspora networks, and formal humanitarian organisations, promote coordination between different sectors and levels of government involved in humanitarian efforts, including the vital security and infrastructure sectors.

iv. Minimise Political interference and Weaponisation of Humanitarian Action

The current meagre aid and humanitarian actions for Sudan are deeply politicised, with the SAF and RSF leveraging aid to advance their interests and political agendas. Aid and denial of access to aid are used as levers to exert control.

v. Research and Data Collection

These institutions conduct basic research and data collection on the ground, providing up-to-date information on humanitarian needs, population movements, and the impact of the conflict. This data is essential for informing evidence-based decision-making and prioritising humanitarian interventions in areas of greatest need.

vi. Capacity Building and Knowledge Transfer

These institutions play a crucial role in building local capacity for humanitarian action. They provide training, mentorship, and knowledge transfer to local humanitarian workers, volunteers, and civil society organisations. This helps strengthen the overall humanitarian response capacity within Sudan.

vii. Supporting Local Responders

These institutions often work closely with local humanitarian responders, including Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) and community-based organisations. They provide technical support, help document local initiatives, and advocate for greater recognition and support for these grassroots efforts

However, despite the opportunities provided by the Sudanese think tanks and centres of excellence, they face significant challenges imposed by the war. These challenges include security risks and limited access to the 14 states directly affected by the conflict, funding constraints and limited resources, political pressures, and potential restrictions on their activities from SAF and RSF. Hence, to enhance the role of these entities in humanitarian actions there is a need for increased funding and support from the international community, greater inclusion of their expertise in humanitarian coordination mechanisms, protection of their independence, and ability to operate freely.

VII. Augmenting the Collaborations between International and Sudanese Centres of Excellence and Think Tanks in Humanitarian Action

The humanitarian action for Sudan must be mindful of enhancing the collaboration between international and Sudanese centers of excellence and think tanks. Presently, there are several notable collaborations between international centres of excellence and think tanks aiming to improve policies, practices, and responses to humanitarian crises. HAS could greatly benefit from linking these entities with their Sudanese counterparts. Some key examples include:

A. International Centers of Excellence and Think Tanks

i. Chatham House

Chatham House’s mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. International efforts in war-torn countries could achieve better outcomes by responding to demands from local communities rather than those of external actors. Consideration of humanitarian principles in assistance operations must take place within the broader context of bringing a conflict to an end and supporting local communities to survive and thrive.

ii. European Network of Humanitarian Thinktanks (HuT)

It is an informal partnership composed of independent European humanitarian think tanks founded to address reform deficits in international humanitarian policies and practices. This collaboration includes the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI from the UK, the Centre for Humanitarian Action (CHA) from Germany, Groupe URD from France, HERE from Switzerland, KUNO from the Netherlands, and IECAH from Spain. This network aims to enhance the impact of think tanks by increasing cross-national collaboration, pursuing synergies, exchanging expertise, and avoiding duplication of efforts.

iii. Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) Partnerships

The HCRI at the University of Manchester has developed several collaborative partnerships with humanitarian organisations and think tanks including the Save the Children Partnership, UK-Med to deliver research, seminars, and training, and share best practices in emergency medical care during humanitarian crises, Support for the Humanitarian Leadership Academy, an initiative to train frontline humanitarian responders.

iv. UNICEF Social Science Analytics Unit

This initiative aims to collect and analyse data across disciplines to produce actionable insights for humanitarian efforts. It involves collaboration with NGOs and other actors to co-develop solutions using both programmatic data and qualitative research .

v. Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP)

Although not strictly a humanitarian group, this Swiss initiative brings together actors from the international peacebuilding community, including think tanks and research centers. It facilitates dialogue, knowledge exchange, and partnership building to strengthen peacebuilding practice, policy, and research, which is important to mitigate the risks surrounding humanitarian action for Sudan.

vi. Humanitarian Futures Forum

Humanitarian Futures Forum is organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and partners in Singapore. This forum brings together think tanks, NGOs, government agencies, and other stakeholders to discuss and prepare for future humanitarian challenges.

These collaborations demonstrate the growing trend of centres of excellence and think tanks working together to address complex humanitarian challenges. By combining academic rigor with policy-oriented thinking, these partnerships aim to enhance the effectiveness and impact of humanitarian efforts worldwide.

B. Sudanese Centres of Excellence and Think Tanks

Although the ongoing war and political instability in Sudan have significantly impacted the operations of many local think tanks and centers of excellence, a few examples of such Sudanese entities focusing on research and humanitarian action include:

University of Khartoum's Peace Research Institute.
Mamon Behairy Center for Economic and Social Studies and Research in Africa (MBC).
Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) at the University of Bahri.
Justice Africa – Sudan.
Institute of Development Studies and Research (IDSR) at the University of Khartoum.
Rift Valley Institute - Sudan and South Sudan Forum.

VIII. The Risks Impairing Humanitarian Action for Sudan

The humanitarian action for Sudan continues to face numerous risks hampering aid efforts and putting millions of lives at risk. The uncertainties include access constraints as the raging conflict and insecurity make vast areas inaccessible. The Sudan government is also imposing bureaucratic obstacles by delaying permissions for humanitarian action, which is also impaired by attacks on aid workers and convoys. Access constraints also include the destruction of infrastructure like roads and bridges.

The huge magnitude of humanitarian needs poses another threat to the meagre actions taken. Over 24 million people (half of Sudan's population) require humanitarian aid, and 13 million face acute food insecurity, 3.7 million children under 5 are expected to suffer severe acute malnutrition, over 11 million people are displaced internally and across borders. This massive scale of the humanitarian crisis strains the capacity of adequate and proportionate response.

On the other hand, the lack of sufficient funding from donor countries is severely impacting humanitarian efforts. Humanitarian needs are rising faster than funds are being committed as the multiple concurrent global crises and the economic challenges in donor countries have led to aid budget cuts. The humanitarian response plans are severely underfunded. Less than 6% of the UN's $2.7 billion appeal for Sudan was funded. Without adequate funding, humanitarian action cannot be scaled up to meet the growing needs in Sudan.

Sustained humanitarian action for Sudan can also debilitated by the collapse of infrastructure and services. The conflict has put nearly 80% of health facilities out of service. Vital infrastructure like water, electricity, and communications systems have collapsed. Schools and hospitals have been attacked and often destroyed.

The mounting political instability and soaring economic volatility could impair any humanitarian action for Sudan. The polarized Tagadom and the Democratic Front are fueling the military confrontation between SAF and RSF making it extremely difficult to deliver and sustain humanitarian assistance. The absence of a clear path for political resolution is increasing the fear of an all-out civil war. Furthermore, the deterioration of the economic situation could exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, as the cost of essential goods, including food and fuel, has risen dramatically, making them unaffordable for the vast majority of Sudanese. The Sudanese pound has lost at least 50% of its value, as more than half of Sudan's population could be unemployed as the war has spread to Sudan's agricultural regions, threatening food insecurity and famine.

Addressing these interconnected issues is crucial to improving humanitarian access and aid delivery to Sudan. Without concerted international action to resolve the conflict, secure humanitarian access, and significantly increase funding, the situation is likely to deteriorate further, putting millions more lives at risk.

IX. Mechanisms to Mitigate the Risks of Enhancing Humanitarian Action for Sudan

Several key mechanisms can be implemented to mitigate risks and enhance humanitarian action for Sudan. First and foremost, it is important to increase engagement with grassroots community networks and local responders like Emergency Response Rooms and Resistance Committees to ensure the domestic ownership of the action. This also allows for the needed decentralisation of coordination structures to be more operationally oriented and inclusive of both international and national NGOs. This also assists in building trust and sustained interaction between traditional humanitarian actors and local mutual aid groups.

It is also important to strengthen engagement with SAF and RSF to improve humanitarian access, as agreed in the Jeddah Declaration and Joint Operating Principles. This can be supported by scaling up cross-border operations, such as those from Chad, and exploring alternative delivery mechanisms. The engagement of SAF and RSF provides the necessary robust protection measures for civilians, humanitarian workers, and civil society organizations.

In order to secure the required funding and mobilise resources, it is significant to draw a strategy to advocate for Sudan's crisis to receive appropriate attention and resources compared to other global crises.

As operational and logistical improvements are important for enhancing humanitarian action in Sudan, due attention should be given to augmenting evidence-based programming through improved primary data collection and needs assessments. This should be coupled with implementing robust risk management strategies, including measures to mitigate aid diversion and strengthen accountability processes and transparency in humanitarian operations. The mitigation of risks also requires focusing on integrating gender-based violence (GBV) across all clusters and agencies.

Diplomatic and political action should separate humanitarian access and civilian protection priorities from political processes to ensure that obligations under International Humanitarian Law are sustained independently. It is also helpful to solicit commitments from SAF and RSF to protect civilians and facilitate aid delivery.

Establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to tighten the connection between planning and implementation and provide room for reforming relevant institutions. The evaluation should also include the process of continuously measuring the quality of the humanitarian assistance provided to analyse the progress made in achieving the goals and objectives of the actions.

Anti-corruption laws should be enforced, including removing corrupt officials and dismantling organised crime networks and warlords. Legal and civil society mechanisms should be empowered to monitor government behaviour, transparent management practices should be promoted in the public and private sectors, and legislative protection should be provided for national monitoring groups.

Promote women's empowerment, protect them from discrimination, and impose maximum penalties on organised sexual violence, which was one of the war tactics in Sudan. Improving employment opportunities for women is urgently needed.

Select key performance indicators (KPIs) that enable quantifying progress achieved in humanitarian actions. The KPIs should be chosen according to the SMART rule.

By implementing these mechanisms, humanitarian actors can work to overcome the significant challenges posed by the war in Sudan, ultimately improving the effectiveness of alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the country.

Contact: melshibly@hotmail.com

Leena Taha